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Abstract: 
This paper analyses the effects of myopic and present-biased preferences on the welfare of a naive 
agent when she is engaged in an intertemporal harvesting activity from a stock of renewable resources. 
The analysis is conducted by taking into account also the nature of present-biased behaviors as 
phenomena that is derived from a dual system of discounting and of response to short and long-term 
stimuli. 
In the task of harvesting from a stock of renewable resources, the present biased preferences of a naive 
agent create a conflict between the long run benefit of the agent and the short run desire.  
Thus, this paper demonstrates and argues that in the decision-making, which involves intertemporal 
choices in renewable resources management, the prevalence of naive behavior, strongly influenced by 
the emotional-affective system, can lead to a reduction in the overall utility enjoyed by the individual 
due to the present bias. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Intertemporal resources management is frequently subjected to risks of inefficiency and mistakes. 
Often people encounter difficulties in defining intertemporal choices and consistently allocating 
consumption over time. Economic theory generally assumes conventional exponential discounting, 
where future benefits are discounted at a constant rate. A discount rate that differs from the 
exponential one generates time-inconsistent plans and myopic behaviors (Strotz 1956). 
Unfortunately, people often behave contradictory to the time-consistency assumption. Several 
studies underline the existence of non-compliant behaviors to the precepts of time consistency - for 
a review see Loewenstein and Pralec (1992) and Frederick et al. (2002). Controlled experiments in 
the laboratory have shown that people exhibit a systematic tendency to discount the near future 
more than the distant one (Loewenstein and Pralec 1992). This depends on the impulsive behaviors 
of people in following the short run benefit despite its effects in the long run. Furthermore, 
intertemporal choices seem to be better represented by hyperbolic discounting rather than by the 
exponential one (Laibson 1997), implying that people make short-sighted decisions where costs and 
benefits are involved. These kinds of behaviors are interpreted as a lack of self-control or present-
biased preferences (O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999, Laibson 1997). 
In the last years, some studies have started to explore the application of non-constant discount rate 
in resource management (Settle and Shogren 2004) and the environment (Brekke and Jhoansson-
Stenman 2008, Karp 2005), discussing issues related to the present-biased preferences in these 
contexts — in particular, the dichotomy between biased agents and rational ones (Hepburn, Duncan 
and Papachristodoulou 2010). However, the effect of present bias on agent welfare in the field of 
resources management has not yet been investigated. For these reasons, this paper conducts an 
analysis of the effect of present biased preferences in the welfare of the agent, when she is involved 
in renewable resources harvesting. The analysis is conducted taking into account also the nature of 
present-biased behaviors as phenomena that are derived by a dual system of discounting with the 
agent’s cognitive foundations. 
 
The investigation proceeds as follows: preliminary a retrospective in the relation between time 
inconsistency and present biased preferences is presented. In section 3 the origin of present biased 
behaviors are described taking care to expound the complexity of this phenomena in an 
interdisciplinary dimension. In section 4 the harvesting model that concerns the exploitation of a 
stock of renewable resources is presented and the analysis on the effect of the adoption of a non-
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constant discount rate in this framework is conducted. Finally, the results obtained, showing that the 
present biased preference of a naive agent in the harvesting activity generate a lower welfare level 
for the agent, are discussed. 
 
2. A retrospective on time inconsistency and present bias 
 
Standard economic models usually assume the exponential discounting, such that the agent 
discounts the future with a constant discount rate. This assumption implies time consistency that 
means that the future choices defined in the present, by the maximization of the present value, will 
still be optimal choices in the future. Time consistency is guaranteed when the discount rate is 
independent from the time. However, theoretical and experimental studies have widely shown a 
higher discount rate over the short time and a lower discount rate in the distant one (Frederick et al. 
2002, Laibson 1997). In presence of time dependence, a violation of the stationary postulate of 
Koopmans (1960) occurs. This violation generates time inconsistency because an optimal choice at 
time t may no longer be so when the task is verified at a time that follows t (Strotz 1956). This 
condition could generate preference reversal, which implies that the preference ordering defined at a 
given time can be reversed in the future.  
The preference reversal is coherent with the observed behavior of agents that show diminishing 
impatience such that the future is discounted with a declining discount rate (Hepburn, Duncan and 
Papachristodoulou 2010). Evidence of this kind of behavior is widely reported and several 
observations clarify that time affects choices (Thaler 1981, Della Vigna 2009, Frederick, 
Loewenstein and O'Donoghue 2002). 
Impulsivity and misevaluations of immediate rewards are included between the behavioral and 
cognitive origins of the preference reversal (Ainslie 1992, Shefrin and Thaler 1988, Benabou e 
Pycia 2002). Therefore, preference reversal and time inconsistency generate a conflict between long 
run preferences and immediate choices, which consequently creates a conflict between the initial 
intentions of the agent and the realized choices. 
Preference reversal, impulsive choices, and the impatience to obtain immediate rewards can be 
explicated by the presence of a hyperbolic discount (Ainslie 2005).1 It is also usual to define as 
“present bias” the baseline behavior that is derived from hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting: greater impatience in the short run with a declining discount rate for a more distant 
future. 
                                                 
1 Or quasi-hyperbolic discount. 
5 
 
Present biased preferences imply that immediate benefits drive the choices despite the long run 
interest; and thus, they can induce the agent to myopic decisions. Present biased preferences are 
widely observed in several frameworks: low saving rate (Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 2006, Harris e 
Laibon 2001, Laibson 1997, Laibson, Ripetto and Tobacman 1998); health contexts (Pol and Cairns 
2002); drug, smoking or buying addictions (Gruber and Koszegi 2001, Thaler and Shefrin 1981, 
Wertenbroch 1998, Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue 2002); and procrastinating behaviors 
(O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999, Bernabou and Tirole 2003). Furthermore, Cropper and Laibson 
(1998) have analyzed the non-Pareto efficiency in the context of project evaluation when agents 
have time inconsistent plans. 
 
There are some contributions to the literature that show how the non-constant discount interacts 
with resource management and climate change policy. Settle and Shogren (2004) explored the 
application of the hyperbolic discount rather than the usual constant one, in the context of natural 
resource management. Karp (2005) analyzed the role of the hyperbolic discount in a model of 
global warming, and Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008) analyzed the contribution of behavioral 
economics in the field of climate change. The present bias has consequences in the intergenerational 
framework. In fact, Winkler (2006) showed that in the presence of hyperbolic discounting, there is a 
potential conflict between economic efficiency and intergenerational equity in public good 
investments. Furthermore, in the framework of intergenerational renewable resource harvesting, the 
present bias generates negative externalities on the welfare of future generations, reducing the 
resource stock even if the current generation has other-regarding preferences. This happens when 
the naive agent’s behavior has no commitment (Persichina 2019 b). Moreover, the present bias also 
affects the agent’s decisions in the exploitation of resources in terms of disruption of cooperative 
behaviors. Indeed, the present-biased preferences can trigger a strategy that directs the community 
to excessively increase the harvesting level even in the presence of cooperative intentions because 
the behavior of naive agents can activate a dynamic of cascading defections from the cooperative 
strategy (Persichina 2019 a). Besides, under the hyperbolic discount, the undesired collapse of the 
natural resources can occur when the agent is naive (Hepburn, Duncan and Papachristodoulou 
2010).  
 
3. Roots of present bias and the dual system of discounting 
 
An evolutionary origin seems involved in the existence of the present bias. Some authors assign the 
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existence of myopic behaviors and present biased preferences to evolutionary pressures (Godwy, 
Barkley Rosser jr. and Roy 2013); for example, Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) argue that uncertainty 
and waiting costs have contributed to the emerging of present-biased behaviors. Furthermore, there 
are evidences that the evolutionary components of these behaviors are widely rooted in human and 
non-human animals (Ainslie 1974, Green and Myerson 1996).2 
For example, the ability to ordinate the numbers in a correct cardinal order is not an innate ability of 
humans, this fact confirms the ancestral roots of present bias (Godwy, Barkley Rosser jr. and Roy 
2013). In fact, studies conducted on indigenous populations of Amazonia show that these 
populations do not have an exact numeric ordering, although they have a non-verbal numerical 
sense. Therefore, when they have to define a spatial ordering for increasing quantities, the space 
interval between the numbers becomes smaller and smaller (Pica, et al. 2004). Conversely, 
American adults define a spatial ordering that shows an equidistant space between the numbers; the 
logarithmic spatial ordering of the Amazonian populations is similar to the ordering of kindergarten 
pupils who only in the second year of school arrive at spacing the numbers equidistantly (Stiegler 
and Booth 2004). 
Hence, as underlined by Godwy et al. (2013), these results effectively suggest that the non-constant 
discount has deep origins in the human behavior. Furthermore, some research in the field of 
cognitive neuroscience support a non-constant discount rate and find two different systems designed 
to process discounting: one for immediate rewards and another for the delayed ones. In particular, 
two distinct brain areas related to the definition of intertemporal choices are identified (S. McClure, 
et al. 2004). The first area, namely the limbic and paralimbic, is an area of the brain that is heavily 
innervated by the dopaminergic system and is connected to short-term rewards (Breiter and Rosen 
1999, Knutson, et al. 2001, McClure, Berns and Montague 2003), while the other area belongs to 
the frontoparietal region, an area that supports higher cognitive functions (Loewenstein, Rick and 
Cohen 2008). Moreover, in the field of cognitive neuroscience, some experiments show the 
activation of the limbic circuit just before choices that provide an immediate reward (S. McClure, et 
al. 2004); similar conclusions have been reached by Hariri et al. (2006) and McClure et al. (2007). 
 
In this discussion, it is worth mentioning that the limbic system is the seat of reaction processes that 
are impulsive and emotional (Hariri, Bookheimer and Mazziotta 2000, Pattij and Vanderschuren 
2008). The limbic system — which is the most ancient part of the human brain — also includes the 
amygdala (Isaacson 1974) whose functions are significantly correlated with emotional activities 
                                                 
2 Humans show more care about the future consequences of their actions that other animals (Frederick, Loewenstein 
and O'Donoghue 2002). Some primates show the capability to wait in order to obtain rewards. This capability is not 
observed in other species (Rosati, et al. 2007). 
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(Cardinala, et al. 2002, Hariri, Tessitore, et al. 2002). Conversely, in the presence of choices that 
reflect deeper consideration for future gains areas afferent to the neocortex are relevantly activated, 
whereas there is no prevalent activation of the limbic system (S. McClure, et al. 2004). The 
neocortex, exclusive to mammals, is the most recently formed brain area from an evolutionary 
perspective. The neocortex’s areas are markedly developed in humans (Rachlin 1989) and play a 
role in appropriate, deliberative cognitive activities (Miller and Cohen 2001, Smith and Jonides 
1999). It is, therefore, possible to assume that consumer choices in an intertemporal context define a 
dualism between the limbic system — whose responses are characterized by rapid impulsivity and 
emotion — with a prevalent activation of this system in response to short-term choices, and the 
deliberative–cognitive system, afferent to areas of the neocortex, which is slower and more 
balanced. 
The joint involvement of the two systems in the decision-making process is further supported by 
Bechara (2005), Bechara et al. (1999), Damasio (1994), and LeDoux (1996). A distinction, between 
the two systems of response to short and long-term stimuli, can be defined: the information about 
immediate rewards is subjected to the substantial involvement of the impulsive system, while a 
more appropriate reflective system refers to decisions about long-run rewards. Therefore, it is 
congruous to assert that the intertemporal decision-making process and the time inconsistency that 
arises out of this process is driven by the interaction of these two coexistent systems, coherently 
with the complexity of human nature (Shefrin and Thaler 1988, Loewenstein 1996, Metcalfe and 
Mischel 1999). 
 
The wide variety of fields and contexts in which the present bias emerges, the evolutionary 
hypothesis, the psychological foundations, the systematic manifestations of the phenomena of 
procrastination and over-consumption, as well as the presence of impatience, temptation, and lack 
of self-control, clearly outline a profile of an economic behavior that resides outside the barriers of 
the pure rational behavior which assumes time consistency. Hence, the present bias is a specific 
peculiarity of decisional heuristics about intertemporal choices, in particular in contexts where the 
long run plans can be object of revision over the short run and where the long run outcomes depend 
on a continuum of instantaneous or short run choices. Frequently, resource dilemmas have the 
characteristics of the context just described. In fact, resource dilemmas describe a situation in which 
long run and short run choices can come into conflict, exposing the agent to the risks related to the 
present bias; particularly, in the context of the exploitation of renewable resources. 
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4. Decrease in agent’s welfare due to the present bias 
 
In this section the analysis of the effect of the present bias on the welfare on a naive agent is 
conducted. The harvesting model adopted in the analysis concerns the exploitation of a stock of 
renewable resources, R(t). The dynamic of the growth of resources is given by the following 
equation: 
 𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡), (1) 
 
where 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)) ≥ 0, with the constant g > 0,3 is the growth rate, and h(t) is the harvested amount 
at time t such that the stock of resources is reduced over time, dR/dt < 0, when the exploitation rate 
exceeds the natural growth rate, ℎ(𝑡)/𝑅(𝑡)  >  𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)).4 The interval from 0 to T is the lifetime 
of the agent. In this model, the resources are materials; consequently, a negative stock of resources 
is impossible: 
 𝑅(𝑡) ≥ 0   ∀  𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] with  𝑅0 > 0, (2) 
 
where R0 is the initial stock at time 0. The strictly positive initial stock and the growth rate are 
known by the agent, the amount harvested is not restorable in the stock of resources, such that: 
 ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0    ∀  𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (3) 
 
Moreover, the agent is subjected to a capacity constraint and a resources constraint.  
The capacity constraint implies that in each period, the agent cannot harvest an amount of resources 
greater than hmax, a value that is strictly positive and finite, such that, considering the non-restorable 
condition: 0 ≤ ℎ(𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]   with  ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 0. (4) 
 
The resource constraint implies that the agent cannot harvest at time t more than the amount of 
                                                 
3 R(0) > 0 implies f(g, R(0)) > 0, and R(t) = 0 implies f(g, R(t)) = 0. 
4  When ∂f(g,R(t))/∂R(t) = 0, the growth rate is a constant exponential one. 
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resources available: 
 ℎ(𝑡) ≤ 𝑅(𝑡)  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (5) 
 
There are no exchange markets in the model, so the agent’s welfare depends only on the amount 
harvested and enjoyed in each time. The utility function of the agent is defined in the usual manner: 
 
𝑈 =∑𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)),𝑇𝑡=0  (6) 
 
where 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)) is monotonic and strictly concave on ℎ(𝑡) in the interval [0, hmax]: 
 𝑢′(ℎ𝑡) > 0   𝑢′′(ℎ𝑡) < 0. (7) 
 
The discount factor 𝛿(𝑡) represents the degree of impatience of the agent,5 such that: 
 𝛿(𝑡)𝛿(𝑡+1) > 1  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇], (8) 
 
Continuity for the harvesting amount on the interval [0, hmax] is assumed. Finally, the system 
defined assumes that it is impossible for the agent to avoid the total exploitation of the resources 
before the end of her lifetime, if she continuously harvests the amount hmax in all the periods. So 
defining with 𝐻𝑖 = {ℎ𝑖(0), . . . , ℎ𝑖(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑖(𝑇)} a generic harvesting profile inside the set of all the 
feasible harvesting plans, 𝐻𝑖 ∈ {𝐻}, given  𝑅0, 𝑔, 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)), this last assumption can be expressed 
as: ∄ 𝐻 𝑖 ∈ 𝐻 ∶  ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇], (9) 
 
and 
 
                                                 
5 The assumptions exclude the case of pleasure in procrastination, 𝛿′(𝑡) > 0, and neutrality in the harvesting time, 
which implies 𝛿′(𝑡) = 0 with 𝛿(𝑡)𝛿(𝑡+1) = 1    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇). 
10 
 
∃ 𝑡∗ = 𝑠 − 1 ∈ (0, 𝑇) ∶ ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑠 − 1] ⇒ 𝑅(𝑠) = 0.  (10) 
 
The assumptions (9) and (10) imply that in at least one period ℎ(𝑡) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥. Considering that the 
agent tends to distribute her consumption over time, avoiding to finish the resources before time T, 
it is assumed that the agent’s intertemporal preferences are given such that: 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0),… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏),… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠)… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇) |0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥∧0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 } with 𝑡𝑏 < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇 and 𝑡𝑏 > 0. (11) 
 
This means that at time 0, the agent formulates the harvesting plan, avoiding to harvest amounts 
equal to hmax in all the periods until time 𝑡𝑏 if this implies the depletion of the resources before the 
time T. This is consistent with the dependency of welfare on the harvested amount at each time, 
generating utility only in the period in which the amount is harvested.  
Therefore, at time 0, the agent formulates her optimal harvesting plan: 
 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}. (12) 
 
The optimal harvesting plan evaluated in absence of present bias guarantees the time consistency of 
the future decisions and corresponds to the long run harvesting plan evaluated at time 0. In fact, in 
the standard rational model, the agent can accurately define her exact optimal path of harvesting, 
keeping her bond with the initial optimal plan formulated at the beginning, and she will do this 
throughout her life. As discussed in the previous sections, this implies that the discount factor must 
be expressed in an exponential manner that guarantees time consistency; but, present bias makes an 
exponential discount factor impossible.  
In the model adopted here, the agent shows present-biased preferences at time t when the following 
holds: 
{ 
 𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+1 > 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1       with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑠 ∈ [1, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 = 0,𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1       with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ [1, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 > 0. (13) 
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When the agent’s preferences incorporate the properties of the non-constant discount factor just 
enounced, the process of maximization can lead the agent to a harvesting plan that differs from the 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 plan defined at time zero. In this case, the harvesting plan of the agent is defined with the 
amounts that derive time after time by the instantaneous maximization of the utility function under 
the same condition of 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 but with a non-constant discount rate. The resulting plan is labelled as a 
biased harvesting plan, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, and defined as: 
 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}. (14) 
 
A discount factor like that one expressed in (13) determines the typical situation of time 
inconsistency.6 The consequences are expressed in the following postulate: 
 
Postulate 1: If it is solved at time t, t < 𝑡𝑏  with 𝛿𝑡𝑏𝛿𝑡𝑏+1 = 𝛿𝑡𝑏+1𝛿𝑡𝑏+2 , the problem of intertemporal optimization in the interval [𝑡𝑏,T], with an existent unique optimal solution, then: 𝐻𝑡 = {𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡, . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏 + 1)]𝑡, . . . , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑇)]𝑡} , where 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡  is the expected harvesting amount for time 𝑡𝑏 with 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡 < 𝑅(𝑡𝑏) and 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡 < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥.  
If at time 𝑡𝑏, the same optimization problem is solved in the interval [𝑡𝑏,T] with the optimal solution 𝐻𝑡𝑏 = {ℎ(𝑡𝑏), … , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏 + 1)]𝑡𝑏 , … , 𝐸[ℎ(𝑇)]𝑡𝑏}; and  at time 𝑡𝑏, 𝛿𝑡𝑏𝛿𝑡𝑏+1 > 𝛿𝑡𝑏+1𝛿𝑡𝑏+2  with 𝜕𝛿𝜕𝑡 < 0, then: ℎ(𝑡𝑏) > 𝐸[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡. (15) 
 
So, the amount effectively harvested at time 𝑡𝑏, ℎ(𝑡𝑏), is greater than the amount predicted for the 
same period when the optimal harvesting plan was evaluated at time t, t < 𝑡𝑏. 
 
The implications for the harvesting plan in this model can be expressed in the following 
proposition:7 
 
                                                 
6 Time consistency implies 𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+𝑛   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]  and ∀ 𝑠 ∈ [0,𝑇]. Only when the discounting strictly respects this condition, the agent’s evaluation of the optimal strategy in every period s between 0 and T lead to the same optimal 
harvesting strategy evaluated in any period t in [0,𝑇]. 
7 The proof is provided in the appendix. 
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Proposition 1:  
There are two possible harvesting plans that can be derived by the decision making process of the 
agent, the first one, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}, where at time tb, 𝛿𝑡𝑏𝛿𝑡𝑏+1 = 𝛿𝑡𝑏+1𝛿𝑡𝑏+2 , and 
the second one, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}, where at time tb,  𝛿𝑡𝑏𝛿𝑡𝑏+1 > 𝛿𝑡𝑏+1𝛿𝑡𝑏+2. If 
under the assumption of present bias defined in (13) and given the conditions (9) and (11), the agent 
develops an expected harvesting amount formulated at time t, with t < tb, 0 < ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
then in the time interval [0,T], there exists at least one period, tb, such that: ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) with ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) ∈ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 and ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) ∈ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠. (16) 
 
Thus, the present bias induces the agent to harvest an amount greater than the optimal one evaluated 
without the bias, leading the agent outside of the optimal harvesting path. So, by inducing the 
reevaluation of the amount harvested at time 𝑡𝑏, the present bias generates a differentiation between 
the two possible harvesting plans of the agent. Now, the question is: does a different harvesting 
profile determined by the present bias imply a reduction of the agent’s welfare, and if so, does it 
happen because of the present-bias?  
 
The agent faces two different harvesting plans that respond to two different systems of discounting: 
- 1 - The plan that responds to the short run, expressed by Hbias, where the amount harvested at each 
period is affected by the present bias, re-evaluating the harvesting plan time after time; and - 2 - the 
long run plan, Hopt, where the plan of harvesting formulated at time zero excludes the effect of the 
present bias and is confirmed each time. 
To compare the two plans in terms of the agent’s welfare, referring to the concept of total utility of 
the agent is necessary. In particular, it is useful to separate the concept of decision utility from 
hedonistic pleasure derived by the instant utility enjoyed by the agent (Kahneman and Sugden 
2005). In this sense, the concept of utility is defined following utilitarian philosophers such as 
Bentham, where utility is logically separated from what choices are made (Read 2007). The instant 
utility is the hedonic value of a moment of experience utility (Kahneman and Thaler 2006), such 
that the total utility is derived by a temporal profile of instant utilities. Following this approach, a 
time-neutral weighting of the outcomes is considered (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997). Hence, 
the total utility of the periods from zero to T is given by the sum of the instant utilities of all 
periods, allowing the total utility to be expressed as 𝜋 and given by: 
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𝜋 =∑𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)),𝑇𝑡=0  (17) 
 
such that the agent’s welfare is evaluated by the comparison of the different profiles of the total 
instant utilities. 
 
As said before, this paper aims to understand if an overharvesting generated by the present bias, as 
showed in the preposition 1, can generate a reduction in the total enjoyed instant utility of the agent, 
and that this possible welfare’s reduction is determined by the discounting peculiarity of the present 
bias. In accord with this aim, preliminary the investigation studies the possibility that the adoption 
of the biased harvesting plan can imply a lower total enjoyed utility than the optimal harvesting 
plan. This comparison is done using a 3 periods model (present, near future, distant future) and it is 
presented in the appendix. This comparison of the level of total utility between the optimal long run 
plan and the biased short run shows that the agent’s utility is greater in the optimal harvesting plan. 
In fact, the utility derived by the increase in harvesting at time 𝑡𝑏, determined by the present bias, is 
smaller than the decreased utility given by the difference between the total amount that will be 
harvested following the optimal harvesting plan and the amount that will be effectively harvested 
under the present-bias hypothesis. 
We can so assume that in front to the two alternative harvesting plans, it is possible that the 
increased utility derived by a higher amount in the present is less than the decreased utility derived 
from the amount enjoyed in the future: 
 
𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) − 𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)) < ∑ {𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡))}𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 . (18) 
 
The main question, now is if the present bias is the element that generates the reduction of the 
agent’s welfare. As it will be showed soon, it is possible to assert that the peculiarity of the present 
biased time discounting generates the reduction of the agent’s welfare in presence of a lower total 
enjoyed utility determined by a biased harvesting profile. To show this assertion, it is helpful to use 
the utility function with present bias preferences that offers the essential peculiarity of the no 
constant discounting. The present biased preferences are expressed in the following intertemporal 
utility function: 
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𝑈𝑡 = 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)) + 𝛽∑𝛿𝜏𝑢(ℎ(𝑡 + 𝜏)),𝑇−𝑡𝜏=1  (19) 
 
where β, not greater than 1, represents the present bias.8 When β = 1 the discounting guarantees 
time consistency (absence of present bias) with an exponential discount factor, consequently the 
optimal harvesting plan is followed. When β is smaller than 1, (13) holds.  
 
Proceeding to show the involvement of present bias in the welfare reduction: with {H} is defined 
the set of all possible harvesting profiles, and a generic profile is defined as Hi ={hi(0),…, 
hi(t),…,hi(T)}. Because the harvesting profile derived from the biased harvesting plan, Hbias, is a 
profile inside {H} and it is alternative to Hopt, at time 0 it will be 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 such that:9 
 
𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) +∑𝛽𝛿𝑡𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=1 > 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0)) +∑𝛽𝛿𝑡𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) .𝑇𝑡=1  (20) 
 
Because 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0)) =  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) and because the first proposition asserts that at least one time 𝑡𝑏 exists such that ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), then 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) >  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)),10 and so assuming that 𝑡𝑏 is the first period in which (16) holds, then, 
 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) =  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) ∀  𝑡 < 𝑡𝑏. (21) 
Consequently, at time 0: 
 ∑ 𝛽𝛿𝑡𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏 > ∑ 𝛽𝛿𝑡𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏 , 
 
and this implies: 
                                                 
8 This form of present biased preferences was originally used by Phelps and Pollak (On Second-best National Saving 
and Game-equilibrium Growth 1968) in the intergenerational context. 
9 The system admits just one optimal solution and at time zero Hopt is preferred to all other feasible plans. 
10 Strictly monotonicity in the utility function is assumed. 
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𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)) + ∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 >  𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) + ∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 . (22) 
 
Because the agent faces an intertemporal decision-making process in which at each time she defines 
her harvesting amount, at time 𝑡𝑏, she will reevaluate her harvesting profile, choosing an amount ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) >  ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) because at this time 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 ≻ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡. This implies that at time 𝑡𝑏, 
 
𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) + ∑ 𝛽𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 >  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)) + ∑ 𝛽𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 . (23) 
 
Consequently, 
 
𝛽 < 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) −  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏))∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 − ∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1  . (24) 
 
Because (22) implies: 
 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) −  𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏))∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 − ∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 < 1, (25) 
 
then (24) can be true only if 𝛽 < 1. This shows that the strategy 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, which leads to a total utility 
enjoyed that is lower than 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, can be implemented only if a non-exponential time discount is 
adopted. 
 
Hence, in conclusion, the consequence of the present-bias on the agent’s welfare when she faces the 
task of intertemporal harvesting of renewable resources can then be summarized in the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Given the utility function of the agent expressed in (19), with 𝛽 ≤ 1, two possible 
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harvesting plans can be derived by the decision making process of the agent: the first one, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ={ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)} , in which 𝛽 = 1 , and the second one, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 =
{ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}, in which 𝛽 < 1. The adoption of the plan 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 , for effect 
of the present bias, can lead the agent to obtain a total utility lower than in the plan evaluated at 
time 0, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, such that, 
∑𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) <∑𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=0𝑇𝑡=0 . (26) 
 
Hence, between the short run biased harvesting plan and the long run optimal one, it is the second 
that can ensure to generate higher welfare for the agent. The short run biased harvesting plan, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, 
can be implemented if and only if the discount factor applied by the agent incorporates the 
peculiarities of the present bias. 
 
5. Conclusion and final remarks 
 
This paper has defined a discount system that is expressed by the coexistence of two discount 
forms: an emotional, rapid, and impulsive system for responding to short-term stimuli and a 
reflective system suitable for the long term. This system of intertemporal discounting is consistent 
with — and is a part of — the complexity of the decision-making process that characterizes human 
beings. This complex process is based on the existence of a highly integrated decision-making 
system composed of two simultaneous main circuits: the affective-emotional, where the emotional 
component is predominant in the dynamics of decision-making and the cognitive–deliberative, 
which is delegated to greater mediation in defining what actions to take given the input received. In 
this system, a conflict between the long run and the short run in the decision output can occur. The 
reason of the involvement of the present bias in this conflict has been presented and discussed. The 
discount system in which two potential discount patterns coexist — the long run with the constant 
discount rate and the short run with the non-constant discount — generates two different harvesting 
plans that both arise from the intertemporal preferences of the agent: two mutually excludable 
harvesting plans — the optimal harvesting path and the biased plan. The paper has shown that the 
first plan can guarantee the greater welfare for the agent.  
 
Before this investigation, at the best of the knowledge of who write, the relationship between the 
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present-bias and the agent's welfare has not been adequately explored in the literature. Studies on 
specific applications involving the management of renewable resource stocks, when addressing the 
basic question of behavior and decisions related to harvesting by naive agents, have focused on the 
effects in terms of resource management efficiency and resource conservation or depletion, 
implicitly assuming that the agent's choices will always maximize her utility. This implicit 
assumption, which ignores the impact of the present bias on welfare, arises from not considering the 
naive biased/not-biased agent dichotomy as an element of an individual agent's system of 
preferences. In fact, addressing issues on the lifetime welfare of individuals involved in managing 
renewable resources inevitably involves a contraposition that can be defined as a conflict of choices 
between those that are biased by current emotions and the rational unbiased. The second kind of 
choice is defined in the absence of present bias, that it is when the system of intertemporal 
discounting is oriented toward overall well-being. Conversely, present-biased choices lead 
individuals to a calculation that is predominantly oriented toward the short term and disregards their 
long run preferences. This conflict is part of the decision process of the agent with the dichotomy 
biased/not-biased choices in the process of realization of the agent’s preferences. 
 
This paper shows that in the decision-making that involves intertemporal choices in renewable 
resources management, the prevalence of naive behavior, strongly influenced by the emotional-
affective system, can lead to a reduction on the overall welfare of the agent due to the present bias. 
The comparison of the two harvesting plans has shown that the utility derived by the increase in the 
instantaneous utility determined in the present by the present bias, could not compensate the future 
decrease in utility determined by the adoption of the biased harvesting plan instead of the optimal 
one. These conclusions pose a question about the effective intertemporal maximization of the well-
being of the naive agent when she adopts a present biased harvesting behavior. It should be noted 
that a harvesting plan derived from present bias could be not sufficient to allow a definition of 
effective maximization of the individual's overall well-being when she is in a condition in which 
she cannot cope with the excessive impulsive component in the immediate present.  
These results underline that a naive individual involved in the intertemporal management of 
renewable resources could not adopt an harvesting plan that properly maximize her overall well-
being according to her long run preferences independently from her ability or possibility to commit 
her behaviors, or to balance the immediate impulsivity with the long run welfare. Hence, the 
reduced welfare derived from the implementation of a strategy dominated by the impulsivity 
inherent in present bias, highlights problems that are relevant to maintaining a given level of 
resources but also shows the need to identify tools that can ensure effective implementation of 
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strategies that are not so strongly dominated by the present bias during the management of 
renewable resources. In the context in which the agent faces the risk of making decisions on the 
spur of the present bias, suitable nudges or instruments could be required to offer to the agent the 
possibility to commit her harvesting plan to her long run preferences. 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of (16) 
 
At time 0 the agent formulates her harvesting plan: 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}. 
For the interval [1,T] the amount defined in 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 at time 0 is an expected amount, so ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) can 
be recall as 𝐸[h(𝑡𝑏)]0. Where the subscript indicated that it is the expectation evaluated at time 0 
about the amount that will be harvested at time tb. 
 
We know from (9) and (10) that at least one period, tb, in which 0 < 𝐸[h(𝑡𝑏)]0 < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 exists, and 
because (10), if tb isn’t the last period in which it is expected a positive harvesting amount: 
 𝐸[R(𝑡𝑏)]0 − 𝐸[h(𝑡𝑏)]0 > 0 [Condition 1]. 
It is assumed that tb is the first period in which: 
 0 < 𝐸[h(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡 < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 [Condition 2].  – and because (11), this guarantees also that the condition 1 
holds – such that: ∄ 𝑡 < 𝑡𝑏: 0 < 𝐸[h(t)]0 < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 
From (12) we know that at time t: 
 𝛿𝑡𝑏−𝑡𝛿𝑡𝑏−t+1 = 𝛿s−t𝛿s−t+1  ∀ 𝑡 < 𝑡𝑏 ⋀ ∀ 𝑡𝑏 < 𝑠 < 𝑇 [Condition 3]. 
Condition 2 and 3 jointly imply: ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) = 𝐸[h(𝑡𝑏)]𝑡 ∀ 𝑡 < 𝑡𝑏. 
Still from (12) we know that at time tb:  
 δtbδtb+1 > δtb+1δtb+2 [Condition 4]. 
 
The conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4 make that the postulate 1 holds, consequently the amount effectively 
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harvested at time tb will be higher than the expected amount, such that: ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) with ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) ∈ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) ∈ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠. 
Where Hbias is composed from the amounts harvested time after time by a naive agent when (12) 
holds. 
 
Proof of (18) 
 
To show this result, a lifetime of 3 periods is considered (T=3), that represent the present, the near 
future and the distant one, such that the total utility is given by: 𝜋 = 𝑢(ℎ(0)) + 𝑢(ℎ(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ(2)). 
The discount is given such that: 𝛿(𝑡) = {1        for 𝑡 = 0 𝛽𝛿𝑡   for 𝑡 > 0 , with 𝛿 < 1. This discount form responds to the discount factor used in the 
utility function in (19), and guarantees the present-bias peculiarity expressed in (13). 
 
At time 0, the harvesting plan is defined by: 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1), ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)}, 
where 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑖 , ∀ 𝐻𝑖 ∈; {H} , and where {H}  is the set that includes all the harvesting plans 
feasible by the agent. 
At time 1, the agent reformulates her harvesting plan for the present and future periods, 
implementing a different strategy in these periods: 𝐻1𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1), ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)}.  
But, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 is one of all other feasible harvesting plans different from 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, meaning that at time 0: 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, where 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)} ∪ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠1 , which implies: 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) + 𝛽𝛿 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) + 𝛽𝛿2𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2))> 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) + 𝛽𝛿 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) + 𝛽𝛿2𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)), 
thus: 𝛽𝛿 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) − 𝛽𝛿 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) > 𝛽𝛿2 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)) − 𝛽𝛿2 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)), then, 𝛽𝛿[𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1))] < 𝛽𝛿2[𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2))], hence, 1𝛿 < [𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2))][𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1))] . 
Because 1𝛿 > 1, then [𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2))−𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2))][𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1))−𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1))] > 1, so: 
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𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) > 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)) such that: 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) > 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)), 
where 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0)) = 𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)). 
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